|
Security Threats and Risks
Associated with Wireless Networks
Low deployment costs make wireless networks attractive
to users. However, the easy availability of
inexpensive equipment also gives attackers the
tools to launch attacks on the network. The design
flaws in the security mechanisms of the 802.11
standard also give rise to a number of potential
attacks, both passive and active. These attacks
enable intruders to eavesdrop on, or tamper with,
wireless transmissions.
"Parking Lot"
Attack
Access points emit radio signals in a circular
pattern, and the signals almost always extend
beyond the physical boundaries of the area they
intend to cover. Signals can be intercepted outside
buildings, or even through the floors in multi-storey
buildings. As a result, attackers can implement
a "parking lot" attack, where they actually
sit in the organisation's parking lot and try
to access internal hosts via the wireless network.
If a network is compromised, attacker has achieved a high level of penetration into the
network. They are now through the firewall, and
have the same level of network access as trusted
employees within the corporation.
An attacker may also fool legitimate wireless
clients into connecting to the attacker's own
network by placing an unauthorised access point
with a stronger signal in close proximity to wireless
clients. The aim is to capture end-user passwords
or other sensitive data when users attempt to
log on these rogue servers.
Shared Key Authentication
Flaw
Shared key authentication can easily be exploited
through a passive attack by eavesdropping on both
the challenge and the response between the access
point and the authenticating client. Such an attack
is possible because the attacker can capture both
the plaintext (the challenge) and the ciphertext
(the response).
WEP uses the RC4 stream cipher as its encryption
algorithm. A stream cipher works by generating
a keystream, i.e. a sequence of pseudo-random
bits, based on the shared secret key, together
with an initialisation vector (IV). The keystream
is then XORed against the plaintext to produce
the ciphertext. An important property of a stream
cipher is that if both the plaintext and the ciphertext
are known, the keystream can be recovered by simply
XORing the plaintext and the ciphertext together,
in this case the challenge and the response. The
recovered keystream can then be used by the attacker
to encrypt any subsequent challenge text generated
by the access point to produce a valid authentication
response by XORing the two values together. As
a result, the attacker can be authenticated to
the access point.
Service Set Identifier
Flaw
Access points come with default SSIDs. If the
default SSID is not changed, these units can easily
be compromised. In addition, SSIDs are sent over
the air as clear text if WEP is disabled, allowing
the SSID to be captured by monitoring network
traffic. For some products, even when WEP is enabled,
management messages containing the SSID will still
be broadcasted in clear text by access points and
clients, making it possible for an attacker to
sniff SSIDs and gain access to the wireless LAN.
The Vulnerability Of
Wired Equivalent Privacy Protocol
Data passing through a wireless LAN with WEP
disabled (which is the default setting for most
products) is susceptible to eavesdropping and
data modification attacks. However, even when
WEP is enabled, the confidentiality and integrity
of wireless traffic is still at risk because a
number of flaws in WEP have been revealed which
seriously undermine its claims to security. In
particular, the following attacks on WEP are possible:
- Passive attacks to decrypt traffic based on
known plaintext and chosen ciphertext attacks;
- Passive attacks to decrypt traffic based on
statistical analysis on ciphertexts;
- Active attacks to inject new traffic from
unauthorised mobile stations;
- Active attacks to modify data; or
- Active attacks to decrypt traffic, based on
tricking the access point into redirecting wireless
traffic to an attacker's machine.
ATTACK ON TEMPORAL KEY INTEGRITY PROTOCOL (TKIP)
The TKIP attack uses a mechanism similar to the WEP attack that trying to decode one byte at a time by using multiple replays and observing the response over the air. Using this mechanism, an attacker can decode small packets like ARP frames in about 15 minutes. If Quality of Service (QoS) is enabled in the network, attacker can further inject up to 15 arbitrary frames for every decrypted packet. Potential attacks include ARP poisoning, DNS manipulation and denial of services.
Although this is not a key recovery attack and it does not lead to compromise of TKIP keys or decryption of all subsequent frames, it is still a serious attack and poses risks to all TKIP implementations on both WPA and WPA2 network.
|